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In some countries such as the U.S., Japan, and South Korea,
students have to pay substantial fees for higher education, and the
soaring costs of education sometimes cause controversy. In such a
system, can education contribute to making the society more equal?
To theoretically examine this issue, the current paper constructs a
simple model that incorporates an educational institute and the price
of education. The model illuminates the following mechanism. The
rich household's demand for higher education pushes up the price of
education at a pace faster than one that the poor household can
follow. Accordingly, the poor are gradually excluded from higher
education, and consequently income inequality between the rich and
the poor expands in the long run. This mechanism also implies that
the high income of the rich, rather than trickle-down, could prevent
the poor from escaping poverty.1is valuable comments. We also
this paper by Yoshihiko Seoka,
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hat physical capital accumula-
thereby helps the poor escape
-NC-ND license.Many studies on persistent inequality, pioneered by Galor and
Zeira (1993) and Banerjee and Newman (1993), have assumed an
imperfect credit market and a non-convex technology as key factors.2
Moav (2002) has shown that the second factor (a non-convex
technology) can be replaced by a convex bequest function. While our
paper follows Moav's framework, we add a new ingredient—the price
of education—to the model. In Moav's paper, the poor can catch up
with the rich if the initial education levels exceed a threshold. In
contrast, our model suggests that regardless of how high the initial
education level is, the poor may not catch up with the rich when the
provision of higher education heavily depends on the revenues from
tuition fees.3
2. Basic model
2.1. Identical households
This section examines the case of identical households as a
benchmark. Identical households, totaling L in number, are born every
period in an overlapping generations economy. Each household lives
for two periods. A household born at period t − 1 receives bequest2 For example, see Ghatak and Jiang (2002) and Matsuyama (2000). Piketty (1997)
argues that an imperfect credit market is the only factor necessary for the multiplicity
of steady states, one of which has more unequal wealth distribution than the other.
3 The current paper focuses on an education system that is privately funded. For the
discussion on the desirability of public education, see Glomm and Ravikumar (1992),
Bénabou (1996), Bräuninger and Vidal (2000), and Galor and Moav (2006).
Fig. 1. Identical households.
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human capital h(et−1). For simplicity, we assume that credit for
educational expenses is not available.4 Under the credit constraint, the
educational expenditure is given by
pt−1et−1 = bt−1; ð1Þ
where pt−1 denotes the price of education. In the next period, the
household earns income h(et−1),5 and spends it for both consump-
tion ct and bequest bt. Following Moav (2002), Galor and Moav
(2004), and others, we assume that the household's utility ut is given
as:
ut = β log ct + 1− βð Þ log bt + θð Þ;
where a positive constant θ is incorporated in order to make bequest
bt a convex function of income. The budget constraint is given by
ct + bt = h et−1ð Þ:
For simplicity, let us assume that human capital is linear with
respect to education:
h et−1ð Þ = γet−1 + δ:
As a result, the household will decide the amount of the bequest in
the following way:
bt = Aet−1 − B if Aet−1 − Bz0; ð2Þ
bt = 0 if Aet−1 − Bb0; ð3Þ
where A=(1−β)γ and B=βθ−(1−β)δ. We assume BN0, which
implies that the bequest function is convex. Subsequently, we
examine the case of (2). From Eqs. (1) and (2), the educational
expenditure at period t is
ptet = Aet−1 − B: ð4Þ
2.2. Educational institute
Let us assume that a non-proﬁt organization manages the
production of education. Education is an outcome of collaboration
between students and teachers. Accordingly, the total amount of
education Et may be subject to the Cobb–Douglas function:
Et = L
S
t
 1−α
h et−1ð ÞLTt
 α
;
which implies that if the number of students LtS and the total human
capital of teachers h(et−1)LtT are doubled, Et is doubled. The education
per student is given by
et =
Et
LSt
= h et−1ð Þτtð Þα ;
where τt (=LtT /LtS) denotes the ratio of teachers to students. This
implies that although an increase in the ratio of teachers to students
can raise the education per student, the effect would be subject to4 Even if borrowing is possible, our results will not change when the upper limit of
borrowing is set low.
5 We implicitly assume that, in the competitive market of homogenous goods, ﬁrm j
maximizes the proﬁt Πj = Yj − P
Lj
i=1
whi eið Þ subject to the production function
Yj =
PLj
i=1
hi eið Þ, where the goods price is normalized as unity; Yj denotes the output
of ﬁrm j; Lj the number of the workers employed by ﬁrm j; and w the wage rate of
effective labor. In equilibrium, w=1 must hold. As a result, the wage of worker i
becomes hi(ei).diminishing returns. For convenience, we use the inverse form of the
above production function:
h et−1ð Þτt = e1 = αt ; ð5Þ
which means that as the education per student becomes higher, an
additional increase in e requires increasing amounts of input per
student (and hence the marginal cost would be increasing). When
teachers have the same human capital as other workers, the teacher's
wage should be h(et−1). In addition, we assume that the price of
education pt is determined by the zero-proﬁt condition:6
ptEt = h et−1ð ÞLTt :
Since LtS=Lwhen all members of the generation become students,
dividing both sides of the above equation by L gives
ptet = h et−1ð Þτt : ð6Þ
2.3. Equilibrium dynamics of e
From Eqs. (4), (5), and (6), we obtain the equation describing the
equilibrium dynamics of e:
et = Aet−1−Bð Þα ; ð7Þ
which is drawn in Fig. 1. We assume that two stationary states exist.
While stationary state e⁎⁎ is unstable, stationary state e⁎ is stable. If
the initial education level et−1 is below the threshold e⁎⁎, e goes
toward zero—the poverty trap catches households. However, if the
initial level of e exceeds e⁎⁎, e goes toward e⁎. This result is similar to
the one in Moav's (2002) model.
3. Model with inequality
3.1. Dynamics of average education
Now let us divide households into two groups: rich households
and poor households, and suppose that the only difference between
them is in their initial levels of education. We focus on the situation in
which the initial levels are above e⁎⁎:
e44bePt − 1be
R
t − 1; ð8Þ6 Using a model where the students are inputs, Rothschild and White (1995) show
that efﬁcient prices are zero-proﬁt prices.
Fig. 2. Rich households and poor households.
185T. Nakajima, H. Nakamura / Economics Letters 105 (2009) 183–185where eP and eR denote the education levels of the poor and the rich,
respectively. Instead of Eq. (4), the educational expenditures of rich
and poor households are given by
pte
R
t = Ae
R
t − 1 − B; ð9Þ
pte
P
t = Ae
P
t − 1 − B: ð10Þ
Let η denote the initial ratio of the rich to the total population:
η≡LR/L. Then, the aggregate expenditure on education becomes
pt ηe
R
t + 1− ηð ÞePt
 
L = AeRt − 1 − B
 
ηL + AePt − 1 − B
 
1− ηð ÞL:
Deﬁning the average level of education as etA=ηetR+(1−η)etP, we
have
pte
A
t = Ae
A
t − 1 − B: ð11Þ
Further, let us assume that the households that received more
education (i.e., the rich) can become teachers and a teacher's wage is
h(et−1R ). Then, instead of Eqs. (5) and (6), we have the input function
and zero-proﬁt condition as follows:
h eRt − 1
 
τt = e
A
t
 1=α
; ð12Þ
pte
A
t = h e
R
t − 1
 
τt : ð13Þ
From Eqs. (11)–(13), we get
eAt = Ae
A
t−1−B
 α
: ð14Þ
Eq. (14) is identical to Eq. (7), and hence eA goes toward e⁎. From
Eqs. (12) and (13), we obtain
pt = e
A
t
  1−αð Þ=α
: ð15Þ
Thus, the price of education increases along with eA.
3.2. Dynamics of eR and eP
While the behavior of average education is similar to that in the
case of identical households, the education levels of the poor and the
rich behave differently. Taking into account Eqs. (14) and (15), we can
rewrite Eqs. (9) and (10) as
eRt =
AeRt − 1 − B
ηAeRt−1 + 1−ηð ÞAePt−1−B
  1−αð Þ ; ð16Þ
ePt =
AePt − 1 − B
ηAeRt−1 + 1−ηð ÞAePt−1−B
  1−αð Þ : ð17Þ
Notice that eR and eP are connected to each other through the
price of education. Fig. 2 describes the behavior of eR and eP given by
Eqs. (16) and (17), respectively. Point E in Fig. 2 is a saddle point, and
therefore eP does not reach e⁎while eR passes through e⁎ as indicated
by arrow C. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Even if the initial education levels of both the poor and
the rich exceed e⁎⁎, the poor cannot attain e⁎. The education level of the
poor may increase initially, but after some periods, it starts decreasingdue to the rising price of education. On the other hand, the rich raise their
education levels beyond e⁎, overcoming the effects of the rising prices.
Notice that if there were no rich household (η=0) or et−1R =et−1P ,
Eq. (17) would have been etP=(Aet−1P −B)α. Then, since et−1P Ne⁎⁎,
the poor could have attained e⁎. Thus, our model suggests that the
high income of the rich, rather than trickle-down, may prevent the
poor from escaping low income.
4. Conclusion
Our model describes the following situation. Assume an education
system that depends on revenues from tuition fees. When the initial
gap between the rich and the poor is narrow, the poor may raise their
education levels in the early periods. However, such periods would
not last long because rich households' demand for education increases
at a faster pace and thereby raises the price of education. The poor
would not be able to follow the pace at which the price of education is
increasing. In the end, the poor would be excluded from education.
This could be an explanation to the rise in income inequality.
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